We nest conjectural parameters into a standard oligopoly model. The conjectural parameters are modeled as functions of multimarket contact. Using data from the US airline industry, we …nd: i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, while carriers serving many markets simultaneously sustain almost perfect coordination; ii) cross-price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of multimarket contact on collusive behavior and equilibrium fares; iii) marginal changes in multimarket contact matter only at low or moderate levels of contact; iv) assuming that …rms behave as Bertrand-Nash competitors leads to biased estimates of marginal costs.
Introduction
Detecting tacit collusion is a central theme of research in empirical industrial organization (Jaquemin and Slade [1989] , Porter [2005] , Harrington [2008] ). In most instances, tacit collusion leads oligopolistic …rms to monopolize a market, leading to reduced and ine¢cient equilibrium output, higher prices, and lower consumer welfare. 1 Not surprisingly, then, detecting collusion is a fundamental objective of antitrust agencies in both Europe and the United States. In the US, collusion is prohibited under the Sherman Act. 2 Identifying collusive behavior poses di¢cult econometric challenges. If we see all …rms charging the same price, is it because they are colluding and charging the monopoly price, or are they competing aggressively against each other while facing similar costs? If one …rm raises its prices and its competitors respond by raising their prices as well, can we conclude that …rms in this market are colluding? Or should we be worried about conscious parallelism, whereby it may be rational to follow the anticompetitive lead of one's rival if the …rm believes that the rival has better information about market conditions (Porter and Zona [2008] )? 3 Previous work has identi…ed collusive behavior by using variation in costs (Rosse [1970] , Panzar and Rosse [1987] , Baker and Bresnahan [1988] ), 4 rotations of demand (Bresnahan [1982] , Lau [1982] ), taxes (Ashenfelter and Sullivan [1987] ), conduct regimes (Porter [1983] ), and product entry and exit (Bresnahan [1987] , Nevo [2001] ). 5 Here, we propose a di¤erent 1 A notable exception, Fershtman and Pakes [2000] show that collusive pricing can lead to increased entry and welfare-improving product variety. 2 Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, any cartel or cartel-like behavior is "per se" illegal. Other practices, where, for example, …rms might appear to be tacitly colluding, are examined under a rule of reason analysis. Probably the most famous instance when the antitrust agencies were able to detect collusion is the lysine price-…xing conspiracy. As reported by White [2001] , in October 1996 the Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) pleaded guilty to criminal price …xing with respect to sales of lysine and agreed to pay a $70 million …ne. 3 More generally, the identi…cation problem that we face when trying to detect collusion is conceptually the same as the one that Manski [1993] called the "re ‡ection" problem. Firms might be charging the same prices because of exogenous (contextual) e¤ects, for example they o¤er similar products; or because of correlated e¤ects, for example they face similar (unobservable to the econometrician) marginal costs; or because they do actually collude (endogenous e¤ects). 4 See Weyl [2009] for a discussion on the identi…cation of conjectural parameters using variation in costs. See Salvo [2010] for a recent work that uses conjectural parameters to identify market power under the threat of entry. 5 There is also an important literature on detecting collusion in auctions, which presents its own econo-identi…cation strategy.
We identify collusive behavior by using variation in multimarket contact across airline markets. Multimarket contact is de…ned as the number of markets in which …rms encounter each other. 6 In Bernheim and Whinston's [1990] words, multimarket contact serves to pool the incentive constraints from all the markets served by the two …rms. That is, the more extensive is the overlap in the markets that the two …rms serve, the larger are the bene…ts of collusion and the costs from deviating from a collusive agreement. 7 We quantify multimarket contact using the measure …rst introduced by Evans and Kessides [1994] (EK, from here on). Multimarket contact between any pair of airline carriers is equal to the total number of markets that two airlines serve concomitantly. For example, if
American and Delta serve 200 markets in common, then this variable is equal to 200 for the American-Delta pair.
We consider a model of the airline industry where the strategic interaction among …rms is measured by conjectural parameters that are functions of multimarket contact. Our modeling strategy implements an idea …rst proposed by Nevo [1998] , who o¤ers a constructive synthesis of the two main methodological ways to identify collusion. 8 The …rst line of research (for example, Panzar and Rosse [1987] , Bresnahan [1982] , Ashenfelter and Sullivan [1987] , and Porter [1983] ) identi…es collusive behavior by estimating conjectural parameters, which revealed whether …rms competed on prices, competed on quantities, or colluded. 9 The second line of research, which started with Bresnahan [1987] , estimates di¤erent behavioral models and compares how these models …t the observed data (Gasmi, La¤ont, and Vuong [1992] , Nevo [2001] ). We take some ingredients from the …rst line of research (the conjectural parameters) and nest them into the modeling framework proposed by the second line of metric challenges. See Hendricks and Porter [1989] for more on that literature. 6 The de…nition of multi-market contact is attributed to Corwin Edwards; see Bernheim and Whinston [1990] . 7 If, for example, two …rms interact in many markets, then they know that if they deviate from collusive behavior in one market, they will be punished by the other …rms in all the markets where they interact. 8 This type of approach that looks for identifying potential facilitators of collusion in the industry has also been recently advocated by Berry and Haile [2010] . 9 See Bresnahan [1987] for a superb review of the early empirical work in industrial organization.
research.
The main identi…cation concern is whether multimarket contact is exogenous. 10 In their theoretical analysis, Bernheim and Whinston [1990] think of multimarket contact as an "external factor". However, one might reasonably think that there is some source of unobservable heterogeneity that determines both prices and multimarket contact. For example, in the airline industry the multimarket contact is a variable constructed using information on the markets served by an airline, and an airline might self-select into markets where it has a competitive advantage (Ciliberto and Tamer [2010] ). We instrument for the multimarket contact variables using a unique and original dataset on the number of gates controlled by each airline at many airports in the US. The number of gates is naturally correlated with the number of markets served by an airline out of an airport, but is not directly correlated with the pricing decisions. 11 In our reduced-form analysis, we generally con…rm the …ndings of EK. We …nd that multimarket contact is associated with higher equilibrium fares using both a …xed-e¤ects and instrumental-variables approach.
In the structural analysis, we directly link multimarket contact to collusion. First, we …nd that carriers with little multimarket contact (e.g. JetBlue and Frontier served 2 markets concurrently in the second quarter of 2007) do not cooperate in setting fares. Carriers with a signi…cant amount of multimarket contact (e.g. Delta and US Air served 1150 markets concurrently in the second quarter of 2007) can sustain near-perfect cooperation in setting fares. Thus, for very high levels of multimarket contact, where …rms are already perfectly coordinating on prices, there is very little impact from an increase in multimarket contact. However, for low or moderate levels of contact, there is a signi…cant increase in fares. Second, we …nd that the standard assumption that …rms behave as Bertrand-Nash competitors 10 This is a well-recognized problem in the empirical literature on multimarket contact. Waldfogel and Wulf [2006] use the enactment of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 to identify the e¤ect of multi-market contact. 11 While an airline can enter and exit markets quite easily and quickly, it is much more di¢cult to gain access to an airport. The crucial observation here is that the control of gates is associated with sunk entry costs that a¤ect the entry decision but cannot respond contemporaneously to demand or cost shocks as prices do. leads to marginal cost estimates 30 percent higher than when we use a more ‡exible behavioral model that allows …rms to behave di¤erently depending on the extent of multimarket contact. Finally, we show that cross-price elasticities play an important role in determining the impact of multimarket contact on equilibrium fares. If two goods are close substitutes, then cooperation in setting fares will result in a larger change from the competitive outcome than in cases where two goods are not such close substitutes.
Our paper is related to previous research that studies the impact of multimarket contact on the strategic decisions of …rms (Jans and Rosenbaum [1997] , Singal [1996] Miller [2010] ). However, our work di¤ers from these earlier works in three dimensions. First, we treat multimarket contact as endogenous and use an instrumentalvariable approach to control for its endogeneity. Previous solutions to the endogeneity of multimarket contact included …xed-e¤ects approaches (e.g. EK) and exploiting regulatory changes to identify a causal relationship (Waldfogel and Wulf [2006] and Parker and Roller [1997] ). Second, we propose a structural model nested in the mainstream empirical industrial organization literature to directly link multimarket contact to the degree of coordination in …rms' decisions. The extant literature has only been able to link multimarket contact to market outcomes, such as prices, providing less information about the degree of coordination that di¤erent levels of multimarket contact can support. Finally, we clearly discuss the mechanics by which multimarket contact matters through its links with cross-price elasticities. This is economically important to understand because it allows one to identify markets or industries where collusive behavior will result in signi…cantly higher prices and lower welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. The data are described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the reduced-form analysis and results. Our structural econometric approach is discussed in Section 4 and the results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and discusses possible extensions of our research.
Data
We use data from three main sources. 12 First, we use data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) database, a 10% sample of all domestic itineraries which provides information on the fare paid, connections made in route to the passenger's …nal destination, and information on the ticketing and operating carriers. Second, we use data from the BEA on the population of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). Finally, we use data from a survey that we conducted jointly with the ACI-NA, an airport-trade organization, on carrier-speci…c access to boarding gates at a large number of airports in 2007. 13 
Market De…nition
Like EK, we de…ne a market as a unidirectional trip between two airports in a particular quarter regardless of the number of connections a passenger made in route to his or her …nal destination. We consider markets in which at least 250 passengers were transported in at least one quarter from 2006 to 2008. 14 
Multimarket Contact
We follow EK in measuring multimarket contact, here denoted by mmc t kh , where k and h are two distinct carriers and t is a time period. For a particular carrier and one of its competitors, this variable is calculated as the total number of markets that the two airlines serve concomitantly. For example, in the …rst quarter of 2007, American and Delta concomitantly served 855 markets; therefore mmc t kh equals 855. For each quarter we construct a matrix of these pair-speci…c variables. Table 1 shows the matrix, mmc t , for the 17 carriers in our sample in the …rst quarter of 2007.
For each quarter, we then use the mmc t matrix to calculate the market-speci…c average of multimarket contact, 15 AvgContact mt = 1
where 1[k and h active] mt is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if carriers k and h are both in market m at time t, F mt is the number of incumbent …rms in market m at time t,
and F is the total number of airlines (17) . Thus, AvgContact mt is equal to the average of the variable mmc t kh across the …rms actively serving market m at time t. This variable is summarized in Table 2 . 15 Notice that this measure is not …rm speci…c. In work that is not shown here we have run our reduced-form regressions considering the following average:
The results are nearly identical.
Fares
We calculate average fares at the product-carrier-market level, where a product is either nonstop or connecting service. 16 Table 2 summarizes the average fare, F are jmt . 17 The average of F are jmt of a one-way ticket across all carriers and markets from 2006 to 2008 is around $223. 18 To control for price di¤erences in one-way and round-trip tickets we include the variable Roundtrip jmt , which measures the fraction of round-trip tickets over the total number of tickets sold by a carrier in a market.
Limited Access to Airport Facilities
Airlines require enplaning/deplaning gates to provide service at an airport. Ciliberto and
Williams [2010] show that limited access to gates is an important determinant of equilibrium fares and explains approximately 50% of the hub premium, …rst documented by Borenstein [1989] . We use information on gates as the source of exogenous variation that identi…es the e¤ect of multimarket contact on the ability of …rms to coordinate their prices.
Gates are typically allocated to carriers through long-term leasing agreements (often more than 10 years) which give a carrier either exclusive or preferential rights to use the gate, while a small fraction of an airport's gates are usually reserved for common use. Given the importance of access to airport facilities in determining equilibrium fares and the inability of a carrier to contemporaneously respond to demand or cost shocks by altering the number of gates it leases at an airport, the allocation of gates among carriers provides a robust set of instruments. In our empirical analysis, we use data on the total number of gates at the airport, the number leased to each carrier on a preferential or exclusive basis, and the number reserved for common use by the airport authority.
We collected these detailed data on carrier-speci…c leasing agreements from airports as part of a survey conducted jointly with the ACI-NA. For the 17 carriers in our sample, we construct the mean of the percentage of gates leased on an exclusive or preferential basis by each carrier at the two market endpoints. For each carrier (e.g. AA_avg m for American), this variable is summarized in Table 2 . The signi…cant amount of variation across markets in the fraction of gates leased by each carrier provides a great source of identifying variation.
We also construct a variable, Common_Avg m , as the mean fraction of gates reserved by the airport authority for common-use.
Control Variables
Carriers can o¤er both nonstop and connecting service. 19 Thus, for each product o¤ered by a carrier in a market, we generate a dummy variable, N onstop jmt , that is equal to 1 if the service o¤ered by a carrier is nonstop. Table 2 shows that approximately 17% of the observations in our dataset correspond to nonstop services o¤ered by a carrier.
A second source of di¤erentiation among carriers is related to the size of the carrier's network at an airport (Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller [1992] , Lederman [2007 Lederman [ , 2008 ). In particular, carriers serving a larger number of destinations out of an airport have more attractive frequent ‡yer programs and other services at the airport (number of ticket counters, customer service desks, lounges, etc.). To capture this idea, we compute the percentage of all markets served out of an airport that are served by an airline and call this variable
Particular aspects of a market also a¤ect the demand for air travel. One important element of demand is the number of consumers in a market. Like Berry, Carnall, and M ktSize mt , as the geometric mean of the population at the market endpoints. Another important determinant of consumers' travel decisions is the nonstop distance between the endpoints of a market, Distance m . One may expect on shorter markets, travel as a whole is more attractive, while in very long markets any form of travel is less attractive due to the time spent reaching one's destination. Also, the availability and attractiveness of substitutes to air-travel varies signi…cantly depending on the distance between the market endpoints.
Since the relationship between Distance m and the demand for air-travel may have some nonlinearities due to these countervailing e¤ects, we include both Distance m and its square directly in consumers' utility function in our structural analysis. We also construct a variable, Extramiles jmt , to measure the indirectness of a carrier's service. More precisely,
Extramiles jmt is the average distance ‡own by consumers choosing a product relative to the nonstop distance in the market.
Finally, we construct an indicator, Hub jm , which is equal to one if one of the two endpoints of market m is a hub airport of carrier j. 20 The variable Hub jm captures whether ‡ying on the hub airline is more attractive than ‡ying on any other airlines. It also captures potential cost advantages.
Reduced-Form Analysis
In this section, we …rst replicate the work of EK and then motivate the structural model by pointing out the limitations of a reduced-form analysis of this type.
Replicating Evans and Kessides [1994]
EK test the hypothesis that multimarket contact facilitates collusion by running the following regression:
where j indexes products, m markets, and t time. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average price for product j. The main variable of interest is AvgContact mt , whose coe¢cient AvgContactmt is expected to be positive. In addition to the controls discussed below, all speci…cations also include carrier and year-quarter …xed e¤ects. In four of the six speci…cations we also include market …xed e¤ects. We present the results of these regressions in Table 3 . Table 3 replicates the main market-…xed-e¤ects regression in EK. We include data for only the 1,000 largest routes, with the ranking constructed after aggregating the number of passengers in each market over all periods. The variables mmc t kh and AvgContact mt are constructed with the data from the small sample. The mean of AvgContact mt is equal to 0:21 in this small sample. This number is very similar to 0:18, the mean value of the AvgContact mt in EK. Following EK, we include a measure of market share, M ktShare jmt , the number of passengers transported by a carrier in a market over the total number of passengers transported in that market, as well as the Her…ndhal-Hirschman Index of passengers, HHI mt , a measure of market concentration.
Column 1 of
We …nd that the coe¢cient of multimarket contact is equal to 0:246. This number should be compared to 0:398, the number reported in Column 3 of Table III in EK. To understand whether the di¤erence between these two numbers is economically meaningful, we can multiply each number by 0:128, which is the change in AvgContact mt that EK …nd when moving from the route in their sample with the twenty-…fth percentile in contact to a route with the seventy-…fth percentile. Using our estimates, we …nd that such a change in multimarket contact corresponds to a change of 3 percent in fares, compared to 5 percent in EK. The results for the control variables, when precisely estimated, are also comparable with those in EK. Table 3 presents another regression in the spirit of EK. We again include data for only the 1,000 largest routes. The only di¤erence between Columns 1 and 2 concerns the control variables. Column 2 excludes HHI mt and M ktShare jmt , which are endogenous, and includes a dummy variable, Hub jm , which is exogenous. The result for the variable of interest, AvgContact mt , is nearly identical. The coe¢cient of AvgContact mt is equal to 0:291, which implies that a 0:128 change in AvgContact mt would result in an increase in prices of 4 percent. Table 3 considers the full sample of markets. The variables mmc t kl and AvgContact mt are constructed using the full sample of markets. The striking result now is that AvgContact mt has a negative e¤ect on prices. A crucial limitation of AvgContact mt is that it is not well de…ned for monopoly markets, for which the denominator 1 Fmt(Fmt 1) is zero. In these cases, we follow EK and set the variable AvgContact mt equal to zero. The problem with this solution is that, ceteris paribus, prices are higher in monopoly markets than in oligopoly markets. Yet, we expect prices to increase with multimarket contact. the predicted values of the regression of prices on multimarket contact when we include monopolies and when we don't. We also include the median spline of prices as a function of multimarket contact. There is clearly a discontinuity in the relationship between average multimarket contact and prices when multimarket contact is equal to zero. Prices are high when multimarket contact is equal to zero (monopoly markets), but immediately drop to their lowest point when multimarket contact is just above zero and then increase monotonically with multimarket contact. As Column 3 demonstrates, if there are many monopoly markets, this discontinuity signi…cantly alters the reduced-form regression results. As we discuss below, the structural analysis does not rely on the average measure, AvgContact mt , but on the pair-speci…c measures, mmc t kh . Consequently, the structural analysis does not encounter this discontinuity problem. It also has the advantage of using information from the distribution of multimarket contact within a market, rather than just the mean.
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Column 3 of
In Column 4 we run the same regressions using only non-monopoly markets. The coe¢cient of AvgContact mt is now positive and statistically signi…cant. Its e¤ect is smaller than the one we estimated in Column 3. Here, the change of 0:128 in AvgContact mt implies an increase in prices of less than 1 percent against the change of 4 percent we estimated in
Overall, the e¤ects of multimarket contact on prices range between 1 and 5 percent when we include market …xed e¤ects which uses only within-market variation in multimarket contact and prices to identify the causal e¤ect of the …rst on the second. This presents a problem, since variation within a market in multimarket contact may be driven by the same factors that drive within-market variation in prices. For example, a negative shock (unobserved to the econometrician) to demand may lead …rms to exit the market, potentially resulting in an increase (or decrease depending on who exits) in multimarket contact and an increase in fares. However, it would be incorrect to regard this correlation as evidence of a causal relationship between multimarket contact and fares. In these situations, as Griliches and Mairesse [1995] suggest, …xed-e¤ects will perform poorly and the researcher should search for an instrument-variables solution. We follow this suggestion.
To construct instrumental variables, we use the carrier-speci…c gate data. Our main identifying assumption is that the control of gates is a determinant of prices through its e¤ect on the entry decisions of …rms. That is, gates determine which …rms serve a market, which in itself determines the value of AvgContact mt . The long-term nature of gate leasing agreements ensures that the allocation of gates among carriers cannot respond to transient shocks driving within-market variation in prices. The instruments we use include the average fraction of gates leased by each carrier at the market endpoints and the average fraction of gates reserved for common use at the market endpoints. Also, for each carrier and market we generate three instruments to capture the level of potential competition a carrier faces in a market from legacy and low-cost carriers as well as Southwest: the sum over carrier-type (legacy, Lcc, Southwest) of the average fraction of gates leased by each carrier at the market endpoints. Table 3 presents the results from the instrumental variable regressions with market-speci…c random e¤ects. We consider the full sample of markets, including monopoly markets. We estimate the coe¢cient of AvgContact mt equal to 0:520. This means that the change of 0:128 in AvgContact mt would imply, approximately, an increase in prices of 6:5 percent. This e¤ect is similar to those from the estimates in Columns 1 and 2. Column 6 is the same speci…cation as Column 5 but does not include monopoly markets. The results are similar to those in Column 5. The marginal e¤ect is now estimated equal to 8:5 percent.
Column 5 of
Overall, our results are largely consistent with those of EK. In the section to follow, we explore what can be learned from a more structural approach.
Motivating a Structural Analysis
There are three clear reasons for exploring a more structural approach.
First, the reduced-form analysis shows that an increase in multimarket contact leads to higher prices. However, we cannot determine the exact degree by which multimarket contact leads to a more collusive behavior, hence to higher prices. In particular, we can only recover the relationship between fares and multimarket contact, not collusion and multimarket contact.
Second, the reduced-form analysis only examines the relationship between average multimarket contact and equilibrium fares. A more structural approach allows one to take into account the full distribution of each carrier's contact with every other carrier in the market.
To see why looking at a distribution is important, consider two markets that are identical except for the degree of contact between the incumbent carriers. Suppose at time t, the multimarket contact matrix for the two markets is given by In both markets AvgContact mt is equal to 0:75. However, suppose that 750 markets are enough to support full cooperation between carriers in setting fares, while 250 markets is not. In the …rst market, there would be full cooperation in setting fares. In the second market, there would be full cooperation between the …rst carrier and the other two carriers.
However, the level of multimarket contact between carriers two and three would result in less cooperation in setting fares. This simple example demonstrates that there is not necessarily a one-to-one mapping between AvgContact mt and equilibrium fares as the reduced-form analysis assumes.
Finally, the structural analysis deals with the sample selection issue related to monopoly markets in a natural way. Monopoly markets are not used to identify the e¤ect of multimarket contact, since there is only one …rm in those markets. However, monopoly markets are used to identify all the other parameters of the model. Thus, our structural model of demand and pricing utilizes information from the full sample to identify demand and marginal cost while also providing insight into the relationship between multimarket contact and collusion.
Structural Analysis
In this section, we describe our structural approach for identifying the relationship between multimarket contact and collusion.
Demand
Our basic demand model is most similar to BCS and Berry and Jia [2010] . We allow for 2 consumer types, r = f1; 2g. For product j in market t (for simplicity, we abstract from the market, m, subscript), the utility of consumer i of type r, is given by
where x jt is a vector of product characteristics, p jt is the price, ( r ; r ) are the taste parameters for a consumer of type r, and jt are product characteristics unobserved to the econometrician. The term, it ( ) + " ijt , is the error structure required to generate nested logit choice probabilities for each consumer type. The parameter, 2 [0; 1], governs substitution patterns between the two nests, airline travel and the outside good (not traveling or another form of transportation). 21 The mean utility of the outside good is normalized to zero since only di¤erences in utility, not levels, are identi…ed.
The proportion of consumers of type r choosing to purchase a product from the air travel nest in market t is then
where
e (x jt r +p jt r + jt )= .
The probability of a consumer of type r choosing product j, conditional on purchasing a product from the air travel nest, is
Together, Equations 2 and 3 imply that product j's market share, after aggregating across consumer types, is
where r is the proportion of consumers of type r and d is the collection of demand parameters to be estimated. 
where z t is a vector of instruments. We treat price as an endogenous regressor and use the average percentage of gates leased by each of the carriers (not just those present in market j at time t) at the market's endpoints to generate a set of instruments.
The Bertrand-Nash Pricing Game
We maintain that airline …rms compete on prices and o¤er di¤erentiated products. 22 We start by assuming that observed equilibrium prices are generated from play of a Bertrand-Nash pricing game (Bresnahan [1987] ). This assumption generates the following supply relationship for any product j belonging to the set of products, l = 1; :::; F k t , produced by …rm k in a market at time t,
where mc lt is the marginal cost of product l.
For each market, this set of J t equations implies price-cost margins for each product.
Using matrix notation, this set of …rst-order conditions for market t can be rewritten as
where each element of can be decomposed into the product of two components, jl = jl jl . The …rst component is the own or cross-price derivatives of demand, jl = @s lt =@p jt , while the second component is an indicator of product ownership. More precisely, if products j and l belong to the same …rm, then jl equals 1 while jl equals 0 otherwise. With the exception of Nevo [2001] , the literature has assumed that is a diagonal matrix (blockdiagonal in the case of multi-product …rms), strictly ruling out any coordination between …rms in setting prices. In the next section, Section 4.3, we discuss how our model departs from the literature regarding the assumptions made on …rm behavior.
Multimarket Contact and Conjectural Parameters
As pointed out by Nevo [1998 Nevo [ , 2001 , the standard assumptions on the structure of rules out a continuum of pricing outcomes between the competitive Bertrand-Nash ( is diagonal 22 In assuming that airlines compete in prices and o¤er di¤erentiated products, we follow a well-established literature on airline competition; see Reiss and Spiller [1989] , Berry [1990] , BCS, Peters or block-diagonal in the case of multi-product …rms) and the fully-collusive outcome ( is a matrix of ones). In the case of homogenous products, Bresnahan [1982] and Lau [1982] provide intuitive and technical, respectively, discussions of how "rotations of demand" can be used to distinguish between di¤erent models of oligopolistic competition or identify "conjectural" or "conduct" parameters. Recent work, see Berry and Haile [2010] , formally demonstrates how to extend the intuition of Bresnahan [1981 Bresnahan [ , 1982 to di¤erentiated product markets. Berry and Haile [2010] show that changes in the "market environment" can be used to distinguish between competing models, including variation in the number, product characteristics, and costs of competitors.
In the context of the airline industry, one such shifter of the "market environment" is the degree of multimarket contact between carriers. In particular, we expect higher levels of multimarket contact between competitors to facilitate collusion. To capture this idea, we depart from di¤erentiated literature and de…ne jl as a function of multimarket contact. In particular, if product j is owned by carrier k and product l is owned by carrier h, then jl equals f (mmc t kh ). This function, determining the amount of coordination between carriers k and h in setting fares, is bound between zero and one and dependent on the level of multimarket contact between the two carriers, mmc t kh , the fk; hg element of the contact matrix. Thus, the conjectural parameters tell us whether price-setting …rms compete or collude. If the conjectural parameters are estimated to be equal to zero, we can conclude that …rms do not cooperate in setting fares. If the conjectural parameters are estimated to be equal to 1, we can conclude that …rms collude. 23 The interpretation of these "conjectural" or "conduct" parameters is most easily seen by examining the …rst-order conditions in the case with two …rms. In this case, the …rst-order conditions are (market and time subscripts are omitted for simplicity)
The …rst-order condition of …rm 1 is then
The additional cooperative term is what di¤erentiates our model and makes clear how multimarket contact impacts equilibrium pricing behavior.
The impact of this additional term depends on two factors. First, the size of f (mmc 12 )
determines the degree to which …rms cooperate in setting fares. In particular, values of f (mmc 12 ) ranging from zero to one result in equilibrium pricing behavior ranging from the competitive Bertrand-Nash outcome to a fully collusive outcome, respectively. Second, the degree to which cooperation increases prices depends on the cross-price derivatives of demand, @s 2 @p 1 and @s 1 @p 2 . This is intuitive, if the products that …rms o¤er are close substitutes ( @s 2 @p 1 and @s 1 @p 2 are relatively large), then cooperation will result in fares that are signi…cantly higher than the competitive Bertrand-Nash outcome.
Our goal is to utilize these …rst-order conditions to estimate both the conjectural parameters and the marginal cost functions of each …rm. The set of …rst-order conditions for each market, Equation 5, can be inverted as
where we specify the marginal cost for product j in market t as
The w jt vector includes Distance and its square, Extramiles and its square, and d jt , a set of carrier and year-quarter dummies. The error term, ! jt , is the portion of marginal cost unobserved to the econometrician.
We specify the conjectural parameters as f (mmc kh ) = exp( 1 + 2 mmc kh ) 1 + exp( 1 + 2 mmc kh ) which restricts f (mmc kh ) between zero and one. 24 We then use Equation 7 to form the sample counterpart of the moment condition,
where s are the conjectural and marginal cost parameters and z jt are the vector of instruments discussed in Section 2.4. Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes [1995] , we estimate = f d ; s g by minimizing
where G( ) is the stacked set of moments, (g d ; g s ), and W is a consistent estimate of the e¢cient weighting matrix. 25 
Multimarket Contact and Collusion
The structural estimates are reported in Table 4 which is organized into panels. The 
Bertrand-Nash Competition
Column 1 of Table 4 presents the estimates from the model when we assume …rms price as Bertrand-Nash competitors. 26 The demand estimates in the top panel are largely consistent with the previous studies of the industry (BCS [2006] and Berry and Jia [2010] ). 24 We …nd nearly identical results for an alternative speci…cation for the conjectural parameters, f (mmc t kh ) = max 0; min 1; 1 + 2 mmc t kh :
Given the similarity in the results, for conciseness, we only report the results for the …rst speci…cation. 25 Due to the highly nonlinear nature of the objective function and potential for local minima, we use a stochastic optimization algorithm (simulated annealing) to …nd a global minimum. 26 We also estimated a nested-logit model of demand with one consumer type. The qualitative implications are very similar, suggesting that the speci…c model of demand is not driving the results.
First, as one would expect, consumers dislike higher fares, ceteris paribus. We …nd the coe¢cients of price to be equal to 1:32 for the …rst type and equal to 0:126 for the second type. Not only are these two coe¢cient estimates signi…cantly di¤erent statistically, but their magnitudes are also quite di¤erent. We can think of the …rst type as the tourist type, who is very sensitive to prices, while the second type can be thought of as the business-traveler type, who is much less sensitive to prices. The mean own-price elasticity across all markets and products for the tourist type is equal to 4:31 while only 0:42 for the business-traveler type. The mean own-price elasticity across all markets, products, and types is 3:042, a number consistent with previous work. 27 Out of all travelers, we …nd two-thirds are of the …rst, more elastic type. This is consistent with the notion that a large fraction of airline passengers travel for tourism, and only onethird of them are business passengers. This segmentation of the market in business and vacation travelers is consistent with information that we collected from the American Travel Survey, a survey conducted in 1995 by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) to obtain information about the long-distance travel of persons living in the United States.
After some elaboration of the survey, we …nd that the average fraction of business travelers is approximately 40 percent.
Next, we can look at the decision to ‡y rather than use other means of transportation or simply not traveling at all. This decision is captured by the coe¢cient estimates of the type-speci…c constants and by the nesting parameter . The nesting parameter is greater than 0:5 in every speci…cation, suggesting much of the substitution by consumers between products occurs within the air-travel nest, rather than to the outside option. This means that passengers are more likely to substitute between carriers when prices change rather than deciding not to ‡y at all. We …nd that the estimated constant for the tourist type is 27 Our demand is estimated to be slightly more elastic than the estimates of Berry and Jia [2010] . This di¤erence is likely driven by how products are de…ned. Berry and Jia [2010] identify each unique fare observed in the data as a di¤erent product. Since we do not know whether the unique fares observed in the data are in fact a result of variation in unobserved product characteristics or part of an intertemporal pricing strategy of the …rm, we chose to aggregate all fares for a carrier in a quarter into one of two groups, nonstop and connecting service. equal to 5:692 and for the business-traveler type is equal to 7:626. This means that the business types are less likely to travel, but when traveling they are less price sensitive.
The results for the other variables are as expected. Both tourist and business travelers prefer nonstop ‡ights and dislike longer connections. Travelers prefer ‡ying with carriers o¤ering a larger network out of the originating airport, which is consistent with previous work; see BCS and Berry and Jia [2010] . The positive coe¢cient on Distance and negative coe¢cient on Distance 2 show that consumers …nd air travel more attractive in markets with longer nonstop distances; however, this e¤ect is diminishing as the nonstop distance becomes larger and the outside option becomes more attractive.
On the cost side, we …nd that the marginal cost of serving a passenger is increasing, although at a decreasing rate, in the nonstop distance between the market endpoints. We also …nd that the marginal cost of connecting service is more expensive than nonstop service.
The mean of marginal cost across all markets is $111. 28 
Collusion
Next, we estimate the model under the assumption that …rms fully cooperate in setting fares.
In his study of the 1955 price war in the American automobile industry, Bresnahan [1987] shows that one can get dramatically di¤erent coe¢cient estimates under di¤erent behavioral assumptions. In this section we set out to test how sensitive the parameter estimates are to the assumed behavioral model. Table 4 shows the results under the assumption that …rms fully cooperate in setting fares. First, we …nd that the price coe¢cients are now equal to 1:674 for the tourist traveler against the value of 1:32 that we had estimated in Column 1. We …nd that the estimated coe¢cient of price for the business traveler is now equal to 0:223, twice as large as in Column 1.
Column 2 of
This large di¤erences in the estimated coe¢cients lead to signi…cantly di¤erent estimates of the marginal cost, whose average is now estimated to be equal to 53:7 dollars, approximately 50% less than the estimates in Column 1.
The coe¢cient estimate of 1 is also very di¤erent in Columns 1 and 2. The fraction of tourist travelers is now down to 40:1 percent from 67:5 percent. This is clearly inconsistent with the information we collected from the American Travel Survey.
The estimates of the cost coe¢cients are also quite di¤erent in Columns 1 and 2. The constant term is almost half as big (0:502 against 0:869). Moreover, the cost is now increasing at a slower pace in distance. Finally, we …nd the marginal cost of connecting service is now less expensive than nonstop service at all distances. This is not a particularly surprising result since longer connections through major hubs often involve the use of larger planes that have a lower cost per passenger.
A Model with Conjectural Parameters
Column 3 of Table 4 presents the estimates of the model where we allow the degree of price coordination to depend on the level of multimarket contact between each carrier in a market. That is, we now look at a model that allows the …rms to behave di¤erently with di¤erent competitors. That is, …rm A might be colluding with …rm B but not with a …rm C.
We start again from the demand estimates. We immediately observe that the coe¢cient estimates in Column 3 are much closer to those in Column 1 (Bertrand-Nash behavior) than to those in Column 2 (collusive behavior). For example, the price coe¢cients for the …rst type of consumer, the tourist type, are equal to 1:32 in Column 1 and 1:189 in The cost estimates in Column 3 are between those in Column 2 and Column 1. The mean of marginal cost is now equal to $77, compared to the estimate of $111 in Column 1 and $53:7 in Column 3. This suggests that strict assumptions regarding …rm behavior, …rms behaving as Bertrand-Nash competitors or as a fully-collusive cartel, leads to biased estimates of marginal cost. The intuition for marginal costs now being lower than in Column 1 is because the presence of the conjectural parameters, 1 and 2 ; allows for an alternative to high marginal costs as an explanation for the high fares we observe in some markets.
Consider now the estimates for 1 and 2 which shift the conjectural parameters. We estimate 1 equal to 3:145 and 2 equal to 6:006. Figure 2 plots the conjectural parameters. From Figure 2 it is clear that carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares. Carriers with a signi…cant amount of multimarket contact can sustain near-perfect cooperation in setting fares. Table 5 provides a one-to-one mapping from multimarket contact matrix in Table 1 to the level of cooperation carriers can sustain in setting fares. In particular, Table 5 presents f (mmc) evaluated at each element of Table 1 . As an example, consider the interaction between American and Delta. Table 1 shows that in the …rst quarter of 1997 the two …rms overlapped in 855 markets. In Table 5 , we …nd that the conjectural parameter is equal to 0:880, which is essentially saying that American and Delta collude in fares in markets that they concomitantly serve. Consider, instead, the interaction between American and JetBlue. From Table 1 we know that they overlap in 84 markets. Table 5 shows that the conjectural parameter is equal to 0:067, which implies that they do not cooperate in setting fares.
The results suggest that legacy carriers cooperate with one another to a large degree in setting fares. However, there is very little cooperation between most low-cost carriers and legacy carriers. This …nding is largely consistent with that of Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] , who show that there is heterogeneity in the competitive e¤ects of airline …rms and that an additional low-cost competitor has a much more signi…cant impact on the level of competition in a market than an additional legacy competitor. There is one notable exception. In recent years, AirTran has rapidly expanded its network out of Delta's Atlanta-Harts…eld hub. Our results suggest these two carriers can now maintain some level (f (mmc) = 0:398) of cooperation in setting fares. Remarkably, Delta and AirTran are currently the target of a civil class-action lawsuit alleging cooperation in introducing and maintaining additional fees on checked bags. 29 The structural model predicts that di¤erent levels of multimarket contact between carriers imply di¤erent levels of cooperation in setting fares. However, coordination in setting fares does not necessarily translate to fares signi…cantly di¤erent from those that would be realized from a competitive Bertrand-Nash pricing game. To examine the impact of multimarket contact on fares, we perform an exercise similar to the one used in the reduced-form analysis.
In particular, we increase the average multimarket contact in a market by 0:128, increasing each carrier's contact with every other carrier by 0:128, and look at the resulting percentage change in fares. These results are presented in the top half of Figure 3 . The bottom half of Figure 3 plots the mean change in fares across all markets for increases in multimarket contact of 0:128, 0:256, and 0:384, respectively.
In both parts of Figure 3 , the initial level of average multimarket contact in the market is on the x-axis, and the resulting percentage change in the average fare in the market on the y-axis. The results in the top half of Figure 3 are exactly as one would expect given the shape of Figure 2 . For very high levels of multimarket contact in which …rms are already perfectly coordinating on prices, there is very little impact from an increase in multimarket contact. However, for low or moderate levels of contact, there is a signi…cant increase in fares, ranging from 1% to 6%. For these moderate levels of contact, there is also a great deal of dispersion in the change in fares resulting from the increase in multimarket contact. This dispersion can largely be explained by examining Equation 6 , which shows the important role that cross-price elasticities play in determining the size of the change in fares. The results in the bottom half of Figure 3 are also intuitive; larger increases in multimarket contact result in larger increases in fares, except at very high levels of contact where …rms are already perfectly coordinating.
As mentioned above, the impact on fares of a marginal increase in multimarket contact depends on the cross-price elasticity of demand. To see why, recall that the cooperative e¤ect is measured by f (mmc 12 ) @s 2 @p 1 (p 2 mc 2 ). Figure 4 plots the mean percentage change in fares resulting from the same 0:128 increase in average multimarket contact for di¤erent cross-price elasticities. More precisely, we use the average cross-price elasticity across all products in the market. The …gure shows that in markets where cross-price elasticities are high, the increase in fares resulting from an increase in multimarket contact is larger. For moderate levels of multimarket contact, the mean percentage change in fares increases from 2% to 5% depending on the cross-price elasticities in the market. For very high levels of initial multimarket contact, regardless of the cross-price elasticity, there is almost no change in fares since …rms are already fully colluding.
Conclusion
In this paper, we build on Nevo [1998] to develop a new methodological approach to identify collusive behavior in the US airline industry. In particular, we nest conjectural parameters into a standard oligopoly model where …rms compete on prices and o¤er di¤erentiated products. We identify the conjectural parameters using variation in multimarket contact across local airline markets. We …nd that carriers with little multimarket contact (e.g. Frontier and Delta) do not cooperate in setting fares, while carriers with a signi…cant amount of multimarket contact (e.g. US Air and Delta) can sustain near-perfect cooperation in setting fares. We also …nd that cross-price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of multimarket contact on collusive behavior and equilibrium fares.
Our methodology can be applied to any other industry where data from a cross-section of markets are available and where …rms encounter each other in many of these markets. More generally, our methodology can be applied to any industry where there is some exogenous shifter of the conjectural parameters, such as regulatory changes (Waldfogel and Wulf [2006] and Parker and Roller [1997] ) or lawsuits (Miller [2010] ). The key step is to express the conjectural parameters as functions of these exogenous shifters and nest these functions within a standard empirical oligopoly model.
One interesting extension of this paper would be a merger analysis that accounts for the impact of multimarket contact. Our results suggest that mergers between large airlines do not necessarily lead to higher prices. To see why, notice that an increase in multimarket contact between legacy carriers results in almost no change in fares, while the same change in multimarket contact between low-cost carriers and legacy carriers will result in large increases in fares. Thus, recently completed (Delta and Northwest) and proposed (Continental and United) mergers between legacy carriers should have little consequence for market power while potentially introducing signi…cant cost e¢ciencies. 30 Our analysis is restrictive in a number of aspects, which constitute themes for future research. First, we have assumed that the relevant level of multimarket contact is at the national level, which follows EK and previous work. However, one might think that the level of strategic interaction where multimarket contact plays a role is at the airport level. Second, we have assumed that the functional form that relates conjectural parameters to multimarket contact is the same for all carrier pairs. On one hand this simpli…es the analysis considerably and still allows for heterogeneity in the conjectural parameters. On the other hand, there might be fundamental di¤erences across di¤erent pairs. Third, our model is static, while one might be interested in learning how the …rms get to agree to tacitly collude. 31 This would require that we model the strategic interaction between …rms as a dynamic game, which is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. CO  DL  F9  FL  G4  NK  NW  SY  TZ  U5  UA  US  WN  YX   AA  •  22  84  683  855  116  273  7  11  686  11  29  5  819  579  339  119   AS  22  •  3  13  35  10  3  0  0  18  0  1  0  50 Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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